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THE BALKANIZATION OF CAT PROPERTY
INSURANCE: FINANCING AND
FRAGMENTATION IN STORM RISKS
Donald T. Hornstein1
After a catastrophic weather event (“CAT”), such as a
hurricane, there inevitably arise disputes over the cause of
property damage, with losses attributable to flooding assigned to
policies issued under the National Flood Insurance Program,
and losses attributable to wind assigned to policies issued by
private insurers and/or by various state-based residual risk
pools. Despite the fact that this “wind versus water” allocation
has been occurring for almost half a century, it is still used as a
symbol of arbitrariness and dysfunction in society’s ability to
deploy insurance in situations where it is most needed. Often, it
is the point of contrast between the fragmented American
approach to CAT property losses and more unified approaches
found in the “code des assurances” in France (mandatory
disaster coverage),2 coverage for bundled natural-disaster losses

Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of
Law, and Member, Board of Directors, North Carolina Wind Pool. All of the
views expressed in this paper are attributable to me solely in my capacity as a
law professor. None of these views are intended to represent the views of the
North Carolina Wind Pool or the North Carolina FAIR Plan, or even my own
views when serving in my capacity as a member (and alternate member) of
those institutions. Special thanks to Rory Fleming, UNC Law School Class of
2015, for invaluable research assistance.
1

2 See Michel Cannarsa, Fabien Lafay & Olivier Moreteau, France, in
FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
APPROACH 81, 85-90 (Michael Faure & Ton Hartlief eds., 2006) (overview of
French CAT insurance).
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adopted in Belgium between 2003-2005,3 and the California
approach to earthquake coverage adopted in 1994 in the
aftermath of the Northridge earthquake.4
This Article surveys recent developments in the ongoing
American debate over the fragmentation, and possible
integration, of CAT property insurance, focusing on stormrelated CATs.
In most respects, for those who decry
fragmentation of coverage, it’s all bad news. Not only is there no
visible political momentum behind proposals for national
catastrophe insurance,5 but the wind-water dividing line is
further fractured by doctrinal differences among jurisdictions
over concurrent cause,6 by the increasing tendency among
private wind carriers and state wind pools to expand deductibles
and reduce policy limits,7 and by recent legislative changes in

3 See Isabelle Durant, Belgium, in FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
CATASTROPHES, supra note 2, at 66-69 (key provisions of the Belgian Act of 21
May 2003).

See Véronique Bruggeman, Michael Faure & Tobias Heldt, Insurance
Against Catastrophe: Government Stimulation of Insurance Markets for
Catastrophic Events, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 185, 196 (2012) (“In
California, the [California Earthquake Authority] . . . assumes primary
responsibility for bearing earthquake risk . . .”).
4

See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of
Insurance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835,
875 (2006) (noting that, despite several bills having been introduced in
Congress in 2006 to address lack of catastrophe insurance, “to date, except for
the creation of the national flood insurance program in 1968, the federal
government has not intervened in insurance markets to enhance coverage
availability for victims of natural disasters.”).
5

See, e.g., Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of Efficient Proximate Cause, the
Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement of Torts:
Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (“Identical classes of loss
following an event such as Hurricane Katrina may be covered by insurance in
one state, but excluded in another—solely because of varying enforcement of
standardized insurance policy exclusions.”).
6

7 See EVAN MILLS ET AL., AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE
UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE UNITED STATES 5
(2005).
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Summer 2012 to the National Flood Insurance Program
(“NFIP”) that created varying subcategories of coverage.8
To be sure, against this evidence of disintegration of CAT
storm insurance in the short term, there is some evidence of
counter-trends that could lead to re-integration in the future.
First, there are signs that CAT storm insurance is maturing
financially. In 2012, Congress abandoned the idea that flood
insurance should be marketed at below-actuarially-fair prices; a
policy shift reflecting in part Congress’ sticker-shock, after
Hurricane Katrina, at being forced to bail out the NFIP’s
actuarially unsound book of business (a policy shift surely
reaffirmed after another congressional appropriation became
necessary following Superstorm Sandy).9 As publicly subsidized
CAT storm insurance becomes right-priced, it increases the
possibility of private carriers reentering the market, especially to
the extent that they might be able to externalize some of their
risks onto global reinsurance- or equity markets.10 This raises
the prospect that the insurance industry might, after all, be
capable financially of insuring correlated CAT risks. And, to the
extent this occurs, it undermines the central rationale for
fragmenting CAT storm risks in the first place –– to avoid risks
that were considered by private carriers to be financially
8 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-607, FLOOD INSURANCE,
MORE INFORMATION NEEDED ON SUBSIDIZED PROPERTIES 13 (2013) (noting the
phasing out of subsidized rates for non-primary residences, severe repetitive
loss properties, and business properties, among others).
9 See Arthur D. Postal, As NFIP Faces Deepening Debt, Some Call for More
Subsidies and Lower Rates, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (Mar. 25, 2013),
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/03/25/as-nfip-faces-deepeningdebt-some-call-for-more-su (“The result of the subsidies . . . has been nothing
but environmental catastrophe and financial ruin . . . the NFIP is flat broke, and
has been ever since 2005, when Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma forced
it[sic] borrow more than $19 billion from the U.S. Treasury just to pay its
claims.”) (internal quotes omitted); see also James Rowley, Sandy Aid Runs
Into Republican Demands for Spending Cuts, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-11/sandy-aid-runs-into-republicandemands-for-spending-cuts.html.

See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS & THE CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y AND RES.,
BIGGERT-WATERS FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2012 5
(2012), available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_overview_2012_flood_reauthorization.
pdf (reinsurance/privatization initiatives).
10
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uninsurable at rates property owners were willing to pay given
the alternative of cheap(er) federal coverage.
The second trend involves the possibility of greater
coordination between risk mitigation measures and CAT risk
insurance, coordination that could improve the risk landscape
for which CAT insurance is sought. To some extent, we can
expect some risk mitigation measures to be more widely
implemented in response to rising rates: fewer properties
located within especially flood-prone areas, other properties
better designed, and properties built to withstand storms.
Indeed, signs of this have become evident in New Jersey
communities starting to rebuild after Superstorm Sandy, as
properties re-classified as risky by new FEMA flood maps seek
out financing for protective design features that will lower their
insurance bills.11 But, there are also signs of broader political
conversations beginning to take place about protective measures
that can be taken, and financed by, political bodies – ranging
from changes in zoning laws to community resiliency planning
to the construction of artificial wetlands and hardened storm
barriers.12 As governments deploy their police powers and
public-finance assets to address CAT risks, it improves the risk
landscape for which private CAT insurance is sought,
contributing to improvements in affordability and market
penetration, and perhaps reducing the weight borne in CAT
storm policies by provisions designed to reduce risk mostly by
fragmenting it.

11 See N.J. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., FACT SHEET: REBUILDING AFTER SANDY
(2013), available at http://www.state.nj.us/dep/special/hurricanesandy/docs/rebuilding-after-sandy-factsheet.pdf (“Under a recently adopted
DEP rule, you are required to elevate and/or meet new construction standards if
your house is located in a flood zone and was declared substantially damaged by
your local floodplain administrator . . . .”).

See, e.g., Henry Goldman, Bloomberg Proposes $20 Billion NYC Flood
Plan After Sandy, BLOOMBERG (June 11, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-11/bloomberg-proposes-20billion-new-york-flood-plan-after-sandy.html (“[T]he mayor made 250
recommendations, including installing bulkheads and dune systems on beach
areas of Staten Island and the Rockaways in Queens . . . .”).
12
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF FRAGMENTED CAT
STORM COVERAGE
Most property insurance, as to dwellings and structures,
provide “all-risk” coverage, meaning that direct physical losses
are covered unless they fall within a particular exclusion.13 As a
general proposition, causation drives coverage, as losses caused
by certain events can be, and are, excluded. It bears mentioning
that, in all-risk policies, the insured bears the burden of proving
that a covered loss has occurred, but thereafter the burden shifts
to the insurer to prove that the loss is excluded.14 It is common
for standard homeowner policies to exclude any loss to
dwellings and structures resulting “from flood, surface water,
waves, tidal waves, overflow of a body of water, spray from
these, whether or not driven by wind.”15

A. THE FLOOD EXCLUSION IN PRIVATE COVERAGE AND
CREATION OF THE NFIP
The “water” or “flood” exclusions became standard in
private, all-risk property insurance when the NFIP was created
13 5 MARC J. SHRAKE, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 44.02
(2d ed. Supp. 2013) (“Under an ‘all risk’ property insurance policy, losses to
covered property caused by any and all perils, or risks, are covered, unless the
loss is caused by a peril that is expressly and unambiguously excluded by the
policy.”).
14 1 MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CLAIMS § 4.03 (2d ed. Supp. 2012) (“Under the all risk policy, the insured need
only show that it suffered a loss to insured property. The burden of proof then
shifts to the insurer to demonstrate that the loss is excluded.”).

Brendan R. Vaughan, Watered Down: Are Insurance Companies Getting
Hosed in the Wind vs. Water Controversy?, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 777, 784
(2008) (discussing Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684,
689 (S.D. Miss. 2006)). It is worth noting that personal property coverage in
homeowners’ policies is often “specified peril” coverage which, although often
covering losses “caused by windstorm or hail” does not cover losses to property
inside a building that are caused by rain “unless the direct force of wind or hail
damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain . . .
enters through this opening.”
Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance and
Catastrophe in the Case of Katrina and Beyond, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 49, 58
(2006–2007).
15
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by the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.16 In part, the NFIP
was a public program responding to evidence of market failure,
the belief among private insurers that flooding was
uninsurable––a correlated risk insurable only at sufficiently
expensive prices as not to be sustainable in the face of adverse
selection pressures.17 Additionally, the NFIP was also an
experiment with publicly subsidized insurance as a regulatory
tool, designed to reduce the escalating costs of public outlays for
post-CAT disaster relief.18 NFIP insurance is available only to
property owners residing in “participating communities,” with
participation requiring state and local governments to engage in
various levels of floodplain management.19 Communities in
flood-prone areas that decline to participate are disqualified
from receiving various grants administered by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”).20 Historically,
NFIP policies were made available to eligible property owners at
rates less—and in some cases, far less—than actuarially-based
rates.21

16

National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4027 (2012).

See, e.g., Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and
Market Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 3, 7 (2006–2007)
(“[Flood insurance] suffers from unusual demand––and supply-side
constraints that make it a relatively difficult market for insurers, and they have
responded rationally by avoiding it.”).
17

Id. at 12 (“NFIP-backed insurance was conceived of as a way of inducing
communities to adopt flood mitigation policies that the federal government . . .
could not compel.”).
18

19 Charlene Luke & Aviva Abramovsky, Managing the Next Deluge: A Tax
System Approach to Flood Insurance, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 8 (2011–2012)
(“Even today, individuals are not able to participate in the NFIP unless their
communities agree to abide by various regulations intended to mitigate flood
loss.”).
20 Sandra Leon & Sandy Lubin, FEMA: Federal Disaster Relief, 17 A.B.A.
GEN. PRACTICE, SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV. MAGAZINE 5 (2000) (stating that nonparticipating communities are ineligible for FEMA’s Pre-Disaster Mitigation
Grant Program as well as FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program).
21 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-606T, FLOOD INSURANCE:
CHALLENGES FACING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 7 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/90/81980.pdf.
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To a large extent, the water exclusion, and subsequent windversus-water disputes, would not be as salient if people
purchased below-cost NFIP flood insurance to complement their
all-peril homeowners’ coverage. But, they don’t. Even though
Congress, in 1973, required flood insurance as a condition for
federal home loans,22 there are widely varying estimates of NFIP
market penetration. At the most optimistic, one study suggests
a national compliance rate of 75–80%,23 whereas other evidence
indicates that, in Louisiana, in areas most severely affected by
Hurricane Katrina, only 30% had flood insurance.24 Other
studies suggest that, of 60,196 homes with severe wind damage
from hurricanes in 2005, 38% did not have insurance against
wind loss.25 Furthermore, regardless of which type of insurance
was missing, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development “reported that 41 percent of damaged homes from
the 2005 hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured.”26 When
CAT storms involve both high winds and flooding, insureds
suffering storm losses will almost always seek coverage from
whatever policies they have in place. And, with evidence
sometimes arising of sharp dealing by insurers, many view
wind-versus-water
exclusions
merely
as
arbitrary

22

42 U.S.C. § 4002(b)(4) (2013).

LLOYD DIXON ET AL., THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM’S MARKET
PENETRATION RATE: ESTIMATES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS xvii (2006). This
result is roughly consistent with evidence that of the thousands of homes in
Louisiana impacted by Hurricane Katrina, 64.4% were covered by flood
insurance. Meg Green, Not Business As Usual, BEST’S REV. 28 (June 2006).
23

24 James A. Knox, Jr., Causation, the Flood Exclusion, and Katrina, 41
TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 901, 911 (2006); see also Amanda Ripley, Floods,
Tornadoes, Hurricanes, Wildfires, Earthquakes . . . Why We Don’t Prepare,
TIME, Aug. 20, 2006, at 58 (noting that, nationally, only about 20% of
homeowners living in flood-prone areas purchase flood insurance).
25 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-7, NATURAL DISASTERS:
PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATURAL
CATASTROPHE INSURANCE 25 (2007).
26 See DWIGHT JAFFEE ET AL., Long Term Insurance (LTI) for Addressing
Catastrophe Risk 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14210,
2008).
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technicalities.27 As a general matter, however, exclusions for
flood losses in all-risk homeowners’ policies are valid,
enforceable provisions.

B. “WIND-VERSUS-WATER” AND THE RISE OF ANTICONCURRENT-CAUSE LITIGATION
Precisely because CAT storms so frequently involve high
winds, driving rain, and flooding, the possibility of losses from
multiple causes often characterize CAT insurance disputes,
playing a special role in further fragmenting the insurancecoverage landscape. Absent countervailing policy language, the
most common interpretive approach to multiple-causation
issues is the “efficient proximate cause” (“EPC”) doctrine.28
Generally speaking, EPC searches for the “predominant” or
“prime” or “moving” cause of the loss29 and, if not an excluded
cause, can find coverage even if an excluded cause played some
(secondary) role, a pro-insured interpretation most frequently
referenced as the “concurrent cause” doctrine.30 Additionally,
insurers in some jurisdictions include coverage for “ensuing
losses” that occur after an otherwise excluded event, such as
See Richmond, supra note 15, at n.67 (relating unverified, but published,
allegations from State Farm employees that supervisors at the insurer pressured
outside engineers to alter reports so that it appeared that homeowners’ damages
were caused by water rather than wind).
27

See, e.g., Jacqueline Young, Efficient Proximate Cause: Is California
Headed for a Katrina-Scale Disaster in the Same Leaky Boat?, 62 HASTINGS
L.J. 757, 760 n.8 (2011) (citing Michael C. Phillips & Lisa L. Coplen. Concurrent
Causation Versus Efficient Proximate Cause in First-Party Property Insurance
Coverage Analysis, 36 Brief 32, 33, 35–9 (Winter 2007) (“At least thirty-five
states employ some version of the EPC doctrine . . . .”)).
28

See Young, supra note 28, at 760 (“Depending upon the jurisdiction, the
EPC might be defined as the ‘predominant’ or most important cause in the
chain of events, or alternatively, as the ‘prime’ or ‘moving’ cause of the loss: the
cause that ‘set the chain of events in motion.’”).
29

See Mark M. Bell, A Concurrent Mess and a Call for Clarity in FirstParty Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 73, 76 (2011–
2012) (“Under the pro-policyholder approach, if multiple perils combine to
create a loss, the full amount of the loss is covered, so long as part of the loss
was caused, even if insignificantly, by a covered cause . . . referred to by courts
as the ‘concurrent causation’ doctrine or approach.”).
30
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fires that occur following earthquakes.31 Moreover, there are
meaningful differences among many EPC jurisdictions,
including
some
jurisdictions
that
experiment
with
32
apportionment of losses, leading to considerable uncertainty
in coverage.33 The result is that following CAT storm events,
often with tens of thousands of property losses, both insureds
and insurers face the risk of judicial decisions at odds with the
contracts into which they believed themselves to be parties.34
To contract around this uncertainty, insurers insert into allrisk property insurance anti-concurrent-cause (“ACC”) clauses.
There are two principal variations. The first, Insurance Services
Office (“ISO”) clause, provides:
1. We do not cover loss to any property resulting
directly or indirectly from any of the following.
Such a loss is excluded even if another peril or
event contributed concurrently or in any sequence
to cause the loss . . .
(b) Water or damage caused by water-borne
material. Loss resulting from water or waterborne material damage described below is not
covered even if other perils contributed, directly or
31 See, e.g., Estate of Konell v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 3:10-cv-955ST, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101081, at *8 (D. Or. July 19, 2013). The court found
possible coverage under an “ensuing loss” clause despite role played in loss by
the discharge of pollutants, an excluded cause). Id. at *14. See also Christopher
C. French, The “Ensuing Loss” Clause in Insurance Policies: The Forgotten and
Misunderstood Antidote to Anti-Concurrent Causation Exclusions, 13 NEV. L.J.
215, 217 (2012) (describing adoption in some jurisdictions of policies covering
“ensuing” losses that occur even after an excluded event, such as loss due to fire
occurring after an earthquake).

See Bell, supra note 30, at 80 (citing Wallis v. United Serv. Auto Ass’n,, 2
S.W.3d 300, 303 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (putting burden of proof on insured
regarding which portion of loss is covered)).
32

Bell, supra note 30, at 74–75 ([“The] resultant patchwork has operated to
deprive policyholders of their reasonable expectations and has prevented
insurers from maintaining contract certainty when drafting insurance
policies.”).
33

34

Id.
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indirectly, to cause the loss. Water and waterborne material damages means:
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal waves,
overflow of a body of water, spray from these,
whether or not driven by the wind.35
An even stricter version, developed by State Farm, provides:
2. We do not insure under any coverage for any
loss which would not have occurred in the absence
of one or more of the following excluded events.
We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a)
the cause of the excluded event; or (b) other causes
of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded
event to produce the loss; or (d) whether the event
occurs suddenly or gradually, involves isolated or
widespread damage, arises from natural or
external forces, or occurs as a result of any
combination of these . . .
c. Water Damage, meaning
(1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water,
tsunami, seiche, overflow of a body of water, or
spray from any of these, all whether driven by
wind or not.36
In two claims arising out of Hurricane Katrina, Judge Senter
of the Southern District of Mississippi found both types of ACC
clauses ambiguous and unenforceable.
In Leonard v.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 37 involving the
35 Young, supra note 28, at 762–63 (citing Tim Ryles, ‘Anticoncurrent
Causation’ Refined by Mississippi Supreme Court, IRMI (April 2010),
http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/2010/ryles04-personal-linesinsurance.aspx

Young, supra note 28, at 763 (citing Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 507 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 2007)).
36

37 Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss.
2006).
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narrower ISO clause, Judge Senter found the language
ambiguous because, read with the coverage grant for wind, it
would literally exclude any damage caused by wind where there
was also involved even de minimis concurrent water damage.38
In Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,39 involving the
stricter State Farm clause, Judge Senter similarly struck down
the ACC clause as otherwise it would deny coverage for wind
losses that would not have occurred “but for” water damage,
even where plaintiffs could prove that their loss was proximately
caused by wind.40
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed both of the district
court’s ACC holdings.41 In Leonard, the Court of Appeals made
an “Erie guess” that Mississippi follows the EPC doctrine as its
default common-law rule, but that Mississippi law does not

38

Id. at 694. The court reasoned:
When the policy is read as a whole, I find that this
exclusionary provision is ambiguous . . . [t]he most
reasonable interpretation for these conflicting policy
provisions is that this policy provides coverage for
windstorm damage . . . and that coverage is not negated
merely because an excluded peril . . . occurs at or near the
same time.
Id.

Tuepkar v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:05-cv-559, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 34710 (S.D. Miss. May 24, 2006).
39

40

Id. at *13–14. The court opined:
To the extent that plaintiffs can prove their allegations that
the hurricane winds . . . and rains entering the insured
premises through openings caused by the hurricane winds
proximately caused damage to their insured property, those
losses will be covered under the policy, and this will be the
case even if flood damage, which is not covered,
subsequently or simultaneously occurred.
Id.

41 Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007);
Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2007).
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forbid the use of ACC clauses to contract around the rule.42 In
Tuepker, the Fifth Circuit similarly found the ACC clause to be
un-ambiguous, enforceable, and to have effectively overruled
the EPC doctrine in Mississippi.43
Two years later, however, in Corban v. United Services
Automobile Association,44 the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that ACC clauses would only apply when wind and water losses
were “truly concurrent,” when wind and flood “simultaneously
converg[e] and operat[e] in conjunction to damage the property
. . . .”45 But where wind loss can be proven to have occurred first,
followed by water loss, the insured must be covered for any loss
proven to have been caused by wind.46 In short, the law in
42

Leonard, 499 F.3d at 436. The court reasoned:
[T]he judicial elevation of the efficient proximate cause
doctrine to a rule of contract construction after contrary
policies had been approved by the state insurance
commissioner would essentially usurp the legislature’s
authority . . . it seems most likely that the Mississippi
Supreme Court would regard insurance policy regulation as a
matter better suited for the Legislature to address rather
than the state judiciary.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

43 Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 354 (“Leonard governs this case, and compels the
conclusion that the ACC Clause in State Farm’s policy is not ambiguous, and
should be enforced under Mississippi law.”).
44

Corban v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 20 So. 3d 601 (Miss. 2009).

45

Id. at 618.

46 See Jennifer McNair, The Winds of Change: The Mississippi Supreme
Court Examines Concurrent Causation in Hurricane Katrina Claims, 30 MISS.
C. L. REV. 579, 600 (2012). McNair suggests:

The Mississippi Supreme Court did not merely disagree with
the Fifth Circuit’s ”Erie guess,” it provided the reasoning
behind its disagreement. The ACC clause was not simply
declared ambiguous or inapplicable as a whole; rather, the
court explained when it could operate to exclude losses
caused by truly concurrent causes and what portion of the
provision was subject to divergent meanings and,
consequently, ambiguous.
Id.
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Mississippi––and many other jurisdictions––still allows for
considerable litigation over whether wind or water caused
losses, even in first-party all-risk policies that exclude water
loss––a state of affairs, the Court observed, that would as a
practical matter tend to work against the party who bore the
burden of proof.47

C. SOME OFTEN-OVERLOOKED MECHANISMS FOR
FRAGMENTING CAT STORM RISK ONTO THIRD-PARTIES
AND THIRD-PARTY FINANCIAL POOLS
Before discussing other ways in which first-party CAT
property insurance can be further segmented, it is worth
observing that there may also be room for leakage of CAT storm
losses into third-party insurance pools, and possibly also into
general United States treasury funds via constitutional takings
claims. Consider, first, tort claims by those suffering CAT losses
against various entities whose activities may be alleged to have
contributed to those losses. Local governments and utilities,
when involved with flood-control activity, may be liable for the
negligent design, maintenance, and operation of flood-control
structures. In Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co.,48 the Ninth
Circuit found that a utility’s undertaking of flood-control
measures established a common-law duty toward those
downstream and created a duty to control floods.49 More
recently, the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Agency-East
announced plans to sue dozens of energy companies for cutting
oil and gas access canals in the coastal wetlands surrounding
New Orleans, alleging that these actions constituted negligence
and/or nuisances in light of the role wetlands play in buffering
the effects of hurricane storm surges.50 As to the federal

48

Corbin, 20 So.3d at 618–19.
Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 526 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1975).

49

Id. at 504.

47

See John Schwartz, Louisiana Agency Sues Dozens of Energy
Companies for Damage to Wetlands, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2013, at A13,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/us/louisiana-agency-tosue-energy-companies-for-wetland-damage.html?_r=0.
50

21

Fall 2013

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 11:1

government, although the result is now seriously in doubt, New
Orleans residents, businesses, and local governments sued the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for flood-related damages
estimated at $20 billion for the Corps’ alleged failure to
maintain the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet.51 Although the
federal government generally enjoys immunity from damages
caused by floodwaters released in the course of flood-control
activities, even if negligently done,52 the U.S. Supreme Court
held, in December 2012, in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
v. United States,53 that the federal government might be liable
under the Takings Clause to downstream landowners for
government-induced flooding that rises to the level of a
temporary or permanent occupation of plaintiffs’ riparian
property.54

On September 24, 2012, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
granted a petition for panel rehearing, and withdrew an earlier opinion
upholding a district court’s ruling that had imposed this multi-billion dollar
liability. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 441, 454 (5th
Cir. 2012) (despite government’s role in MRGO not involving ”flood control
activities”). The case is awaiting further decision by the entire Fifth Circuit on
the ground of general federal government immunity for discretionary decisions.
This recent reversal, as to the federal government’s third-party liability did not
directly affect a parallel lawsuit, against the Washington Group (and its liability
insurers), a private contractor alleged to have dug holes in the Industrial Canal
as part of a lock replacement project, which began trial proceedings in
September 2012. However, in April 2013, the district court in that case issued a
judgment for the government and its contractor. See In re Katrina Canal
Breaches Consolidated Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53802 (E.D. La. Apr.
12, 2013).
51

52

See Cent. Green Co. v United States, 531 U.S. 425, 426–27 (2001).

53

Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012).

Id. at 522; see generally Magdalene Carter, Flooding the Possibility of
Recovery Under a Temporary Takings Analysis: The Drowning Effects of
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 23 Vill. Envt’l. L.J. 211
(2012) (discussing ramifications of Unites States Court of Appeals for Federal
Circuit decisions in the case).
54
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D. THE HOLLOWING OUT OF PRIVATE CAT WIND
COVERAGE
Even if we restrict analysis to the fragmentation of first-party
CAT storm coverage, and set aside all wind-water ambiguities,
in recent years there has evolved an unmistakable pattern in
private all-peril policies, at least as regards coverage for CAT
wind. The trend is toward increased self-insurance for firstdollar losses, and increased use of excess insurance for lastdollar coverage.55 At best, private insurers are increasingly
offering only hollowed-out CAT wind coverage.56 At worst,
private insurers are now exiting markets for CAT wind coverage
as surely as they exited markets for CAT flood insurance in the
1960’s.57 In their place, there have emerged state-run residual
risk wind pools that are increasingly doing for CAT wind what
FEMA did, historically, for CAT flood – making insurance
available at below-market rates.58
It is hard to understate the effect catastrophes have had on
insurers within the past forty years. As Jaffee, Kunreuther, and
Michel-Kerjan stated in 2008, “[b]etween 1970 and the mid1980s, annual insured losses from natural disasters (including
See Hurricane Irene Likely to Strike East Coast: Do You Know What
Your Hurricane Deductible Is?, INS. INFO. INST. (Aug. 25, 2011), available at
www.iii.org/press-releases/hurricane-irene-likely-to-strike-east-coast-do-youknow-what-your-hurricane-deductible-is.html ("In some coastal areas with high
wind risk, insurers may incorporate hurricane deductibles even higher than 5
percent);
Coastal
Property
Insurance,
COCHRAN
INS.
AGENCY,
www.coastalpropertyinsurance.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2013) ("Excess
coverage now available in North Carolina . . . the North Carolina Beach Plan will
only be responsible on ‘primary’ up to $750,000").
55

56 See, e.g., J. Robert Hunter, The Insurance Industry's Incredible
Disappearing Weather Catastrophe Risk: How Insurers Have Shifted Risk
and Cost Associated with Weather Catastrophes to Consumers and Taxpayers,
CONSUMER FED’N. OF AM. 1 (Feb. 17, 2012),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/InsuranceRegulationHurricaneRiskDisappe
aringCoverageStudy2-12.pdf (insurer savings "have been achieved by hallowing
out coverage in homeowners’ insurance policies and raising rates.").

Id. ("[I]ndustry data demonstrates that insurers have significantly and
methodically decreased their financial responsibility for those events in past
years and shifted much of this risk to consumers and taxpayers.").
57

58

Id.
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forest fires) were in the $3 to $4 billion range. . . . total losses
paid by private insurers due to major natural catastrophes were
$87 billion in 2005.”59 To some extent, the overall increase and
volatility of year-to-year CAT losses may reflect early signs of the
gradual effects of climate change on CAT risks, including longterm changes to the frequency and severity of storms.60 But,
equally important to insurers are worst-case risks that can swing
wildly from year-to-year, exposing insurers to solvency risks. In
1992, Hurricane Andrew led to the bankruptcy of ten Florida
insurers, and imperiled the Florida Insurance Guaranty
Association.61 In 2006, six years before Superstorm Sandy,
some prognosticators predicted “a northeastern hurricane twice
as costly as Katrina that could devastate the New York boroughs
of Brooklyn and Manhattan and submerge nearby parts of New
Jersey.”62 Concerned about just such worst-case scenarios,
private risk-rating agencies such as AIR International (“AIR”)
and Risk Management Solutions (“RMS”), employ proprietary
risk models that are notorious for changing overnight, such as a
2011 RMS Model that increased hurricane risks almost
overnight by 150 percent, attacked by its critics for in essence
making Ohio a coastal state.63 Of course, in October 2012, the
59

JAFFE ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.

60 See Evan Mills, Insurance in a Climate of Change, 309 SCIENCE 1040,
1040–41 (2005) (insurance is the world’s foremost integrator of climate-related
impacts); see also Jeff Masters, 2011’s Billion-Dollar Disasters: Is Climate
Change to Blame?, 65 WEATHERWISE 12, 15 (2012) (discussing the possibility
that climate change has led to greater CAT losses and the potential financial
impact of recent incremental weather changes on losses); see also Laurens M.
Bouwer, Have Disaster Losses Increased Due to Anthropogenic Climate
Change?, 92 AMER. METEOR. SOC. 39, 41–42 (2011) (22 studies show an increase
in disaster losses in recent decades, although 14 of them accredit conflating
factors, including wealth/population increases in areas of weather-related risk).
61

Richmond, supra note 15, at 53.

62 Id. at 50. (citing Amanda Riply, Why We Don’t Prepare for Disaster,
TIME, Aug 28, 2006, at 54, 57 (“a serious hurricane is due to strike New York
City, just as one did in 1821 and 1938)).

See Chad Hemenway, Cat Modeling: Ingrained in the Industry,
Embroiled in Controversy, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (Mar. 21, 2011), available
at http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/03/18/cat-modeling-ingrainedin-the-industry-embroiled-i.
63
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path of Superstorm Sandy eerily fulfilled both of these
predictions, even to the point of bringing unprecedented storm
damage to Ohio after making its infamous “left turn” at New
Jersey and heading inland.64 In addition to outright solvency
concerns, insurers worry about these volatile models because of
their influence on rating agencies such as A.M. Best, Fitch, and
Standard & Poor’s because ratings from these agencies affect the
ability of insurers to attract customers and capital.65
Rational CAT insurers hardly need to wait for resolution of
the scientific debate over climate change, or to subject
themselves fully to the volatility of risk models. Because most
property insurance is marketed on a year-to-year basis, insurers
respond to underwriting uncertainties fairly quickly; the most
obvious response is to seek rate increases to hedge the worstcase prospects of unexpectedly high losses. Between 2001 and
2006, rates for homeowners’ insurance in Florida rose 77%, in
Louisiana 65%, and in South Carolina 56%.66 But, depending on
state-by-state procedures for rate increases, it is at this point
that connections between weather catastrophes and insurance
See Karen Farkas, Superstorm Sandy Aftermath Leaves Northeast Ohio
Powerless and Busy Cleaning Up, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://www.cleveland.com/metro/index/ssf/2012/10/superstorm_sandy_after
math_lea.html.
64

65 See, e.g., IL. DEPT. OF INS., FINDING A REPUTABLE INSURANCE COMPANY:
USING FINANCIAL RATING AGENCIES,
http://insurance.illinois.gov/General/find_reputable.asp (last revised June
2009); see also Karen Clark, How Can Rating Agencies Better Gauge Carrier
Cat-Risk Exposure?, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (May 16, 2011), available at
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2011/05/16/how-can-rating-agenciesbetter-gauge-carrier-cat-.

See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, BLOWN AWAY: HOW GLOBAL
INSURANCE IS ERODING THE AVAILABILITY OF INSURANCE COVERAGE IN AMERICA’S
COASTAL CITIES v-viii (2007), available at
http://emerginglitigation.shb.com/Portals/f81bfc4f-cc59-46fe-9ed57795e6eea5b5/7301_BlownAway_insurancereport.pdf; see also, Associated
Press, Customers Cry Foul as Homeowner Insurance Costs Jump, Especially in
Hurricane Areas, THE OREGONIAN (May 31, 2013),
http://www.oregonlive.com/today/index.ssf/2013/05/customers_cry_foul_as
_homeowne.html (“Nationwide, the cost of homeowners’ insurance rose 36
percent from 2003 to 2010—almost double the rate of inflation . . . [r]ates in
Florida rose 91 percent, most in the nation, while rates in Rhode Island went up
62 percent.”).
66
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pivot into public law and the politics of coverage. Next, a second
pivotal point begins when insurers do not get regulatory
approval for all of the rate increases they seek. When this
happens, insurers employ several mechanisms to limit their
exposure to CAT risks: they simply stop writing insurance within
a state’s high-risk areas,67 they sharply limit the maximum
amounts of insurance they are prepared to offer any individual
insured,68 and/or they force insureds to bear a greater
proportion of losses through higher deductibles or copayments.69
The overall effect of these market mechanisms is to create an
insurance landscape of increasingly hollowed-out coverage, in
which even those who can afford insurance are paying more for
less, effectively being forced to self-insure ever-larger amounts
of their own risk. The increasing retention of CAT-related risks
by insureds is notable. In Florida, when an unprecedented
sequence of four hurricanes swept the state in 2004, those who
had insurance nevertheless bore 15–20% of the financial
losses.70 In North Carolina, legislation adopted in 2009 capped
the maximum policy limit that the state’s residual wind pool
could offer homeowners for dwellings and structures at
$750,000.71
67 See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supra note 66, at 17 (“Allstate, which has
dropped approximately 320,000 policies since 2004 in Florida, is no longer
writing new coverage anywhere in the state.”). In 2008, coastal homeowners’
coverage in North Carolina became a public policy issue when Farmers
Insurance decided to withdraw from property insurance statewide rather than
participate in what it believed to be a system of actuarially unfair rates and postevent assessments for shortfalls. See Brian H. Kern, Farmers Insurance to Pull
Out of North Carolina Homeowners' Market, INS. JOURNAL (Aug. 14, 2008),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2008/08/14/92787.htm
(‘“Farmers regrets having to non-renew our homeowners customers, but the
current hurricane assessment process has forced us to make this difficult
business decision”’).
68 See EVAN MILLS ET AL., AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY OF INSURANCE
UNDER CLIMATE CHANGE: A GROWING CHALLENGE FOR THE U.S. 2 (2005).
69

Id.

70

Id.

71 See H.B. 1305, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., (N.C. 2009), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2009/Bills/House/PDF/H1305v7.pdf. The
$750,000 policy limit is found in Section 58-45-41: Coverage Limits.
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This is not to say that insurers, in what remains of the
private market for coastal CAT insurance, which are primarily
wind losses, are behaving irrationally, at least in the corporate
world in which they must remain cognizant of their ability to
attract investment capital. But it is to say that there is more to
the story than the common scenario put forth by CAT insurers
when seeking rate increases, namely that any profits they show
in the “good” years––meaning the is weather relatively quiet––
is more than offset in the catastrophic years. Rather, by a
combination of increased revenue through higher premiums,
often based on CAT models justifying higher rates than
historical models, hollowing out their risk exposure, and the
purchasing of reinsurance or other financial instruments to limit
their losses in the event of worst-case scenarios, those dwindling
property/casualty insurers that remain in the business
increasingly shed risks to the point that they can sometimes
enjoy less investment risk than the market in general. Robert
Hunter explains:
[The risk of a stock is] shown in any Value Line
publication, which tests the risk of a stock. One
key measure is the stock’s Beta, which is the
sensitivity of a stock’s returns to the returns on
some market index, such as the Standard & Poor’s
500. A Beta between 0 and 1, such as utility
stocks, is a low-volatility investment. A Beta equal
to 1 matches the index. A Beta greater than 1 is
anything more volatile than the index, such as a
“small cap” fund.
Consider Allstate. At the same time the company has taken
draconian steps to sharply raise premiums and/or reduce
coverage for many homeowners in coastal areas, it has
presented shareholders with very low risk: Beta = 0.90 . . . .72

Additional Perspectives on the Need for Insurance Regulatory Reform,
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored
Enterprises, Of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 14 (2007) (statement of
J. Robert Hunter, Dir. of Ins., Consumer Fed’n of Am.).
72

27

Fall 2013

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 11:1

Although plainly, as the “global aggregator” of climaterelated losses, insurers can be drastically affected financially
when weather catastrophes occur, it is precisely for this reason
that insurers have, and will continue to, rationally take steps not
to be on the bleeding edge of these financial effects. Private
insurers in the twenty-first century are in the process of exiting
CAT wind markets, just as they exited CAT flood markets in the
twentieth century.

E. THE EMERGENCE OF STATE RESIDUAL RISK POOLS FOR
CAT WIND COVERAGE
To fill the void, states in the southeast and gulf-coast region
of the United States are increasingly relying on public or quasipublic residual risk pools for wind insurance, much like the
federal government created the NFIP as a national high-risk
pool for flood insurance forty-five years ago. In 2002, Florida
created the Citizens Property Corporation.73 In 2003, Louisiana
created the Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Association.74
Texas has created the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association,75
Mississippi
the
Mississippi
Windstorm
Underwriting
Association,76 and Alabama its “Beach Pool.”77 These plans and
others typically reflect the structure of residual high-risk
insurance entities in which the state conditions the right to sell
insurance within the state with forced participation in its Fair
Access to Insurance Requirement (“FAIR”) plans. For purposes
See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (2002), available at
http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?mode=View%20Statutes&SubM
enu=1&App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=627.351&URL=CH0627/
Sec351.HTM.
73

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2293 (2003), available at
http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/Law.aspx?d=509389.
74

75 See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 2210.01 (West 2007), available at
http://www.statutes.legis.state.tx.us/Docs/IN/htm/IN.2210.htm.

See MISS. STAT. ANN. § 83-34-3 (2007), available at
http://statutes.laws.com/mississippi/title-83/34/83-34-3.
76

77 See ALA. CODE § 27-1-24 (2009), available at
http://alisondb.legislature.state.al.us/acas/ACASLoginMac.asp. The full name
for the risk pool is the Alabama Insurance Underwriting Association. Id.
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of this article, I will assume the constitutionality of this public
policy movement.78 Typically, state wind pools are created as
“insurers of last resort” for homeowners who cannot find
affordable––or any––private CAT coverage.79 What is
unmistakable is that these entities have become the fastest
growing mechanism by which coastal homeowners obtain CAT
wind insurance. Compared to approximately $55 billion in
exposure to loss in 1990, state-run FAIR plans had, by 2007,
become exposed to over $500 billion in potential losses.80 By
2007, Florida’s Citizens program had become Florida’s largest
property insurer of first resort81 and the fourth-largest property
insurer outright in the nation.82 North Carolina’s “Beach Plan”
currently insures approximately 75% of the residential wind risk

78 There are, of course, those who question the constitutionality of these
arrangements. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights and Insurance
Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 298
(1999).
79

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b) (2012).
It is the intent of the Legislature that the rates for coverage
provided by the association be actuarially sound and not
competitive with approved rates charged in the admitted
voluntary market such that the association functions as a
residual market mechanism to provide insurance only when
the insurance cannot be procured in the voluntary market.

80

See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE, supra note 66, at 8.

See Jean Gross, The Insurer of First Resort, BUS. OBSERVER FL (Jan. 20,
2011), http://www.businessobserverfl.com/section/detail/the-insurer-of-firstresort/ ("When it was created after Andres, Citizens was supposed to be the
insurer of last resort . . . [t]oday, the state-owned agency has become the largest
residential property insurer in Florida . . . .").
81

Tom Zucco & Jennifer Liberto, Citizens’ Business Booms, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (June 26, 2007),
http://www.sptimes.com/2007/06/26/Business/Citizens__business_bo.shtml
(“Citizens currently has about 1.3-million homeowner policies, and its
commercial business is growing by 1,000 percent this year. That makes Citizens
the fourth-largest property insurer in the nation.”).
82
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on North Carolina’s famous Outer Banks and other barrier
islands.83

II. THE FUTURE OF CAT FLOOD AND CAT WIND
COVERAGE
A. JULY 2012: A SEA CHANGE IN THE NFIP AND THE
ECONOMICS OF CAT FLOOD COVERAGE
That Congress, and in particular this Congress, enacted
sweeping changes to the NFIP in the summer of an election
year, deserves special note. Although I leave a full recounting of
this remarkable political event for another time, suffice it to note
that on July 6, 2012, President Obama signed into law the
“Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012,”84
certainly the most significant revision to the NFIP in twenty
years.85 Among its short-term achievements, it authorized
funding for the NFIP over the next five years,86 against a
backdrop of dozens of disruptive, short-term extensions of the
NFIP program over the last few years that were reminiscent, on
this small stage, of the current Congress’ use of precisely such
short-term funding extensions in larger budget battles with the
White House. In short, Biggert-Waters was a significant, and
almost completely overlooked, sign of political cooperation over
a significant budgetary matter. And the bipartisan support it
drew, in particular in its elimination of the NFIP’s tradition of
subsidizing below-cost flood insurance, laid down the
groundwork for the unusual bipartisan political configurations
83 Email from Gin Schwitzgebel, Gen. Manager, N.C. Joint Underwriting
Ass’n, to Donald T. Hornstein, Aubrey L. Brooks Professor of Law, Univ. of N.C.
Sch. of Law. (Nov. 11, 2013) (on file with author).
84 Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141,
126 Stat. 916 (2012) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129).

See Eli Lehrer, Strange Bedfellows: Smartersafer.org and the BiggertWaters Act of 2012, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 351, 352 (2013) (“The BiggertWaters Act may well be the largest revamping of the flood insurance program
since its origin in 1968.”).
85

86

Id. at 353.
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that emerged in January 2013 when Congress, over significant
objections from fiscal conservatives, enacted the $50.5 billion
package for Superstorm Sandy relief.87
Although I want to highlight mostly the Act’s central
contribution toward eliminating the subsidized nature of NFIP
flood insurance, one of its less noticed provisions is especially
germane to the subject of fragmented risk and, in particular, to
the “wind-versus water” elements of CAT storm coverage. A
part of the Act included provisions of a parallel bill, the
“Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses
(“COASTAL”) Act of 2012, which had been introduced.88 Under
its COASTAL Act provisions, Biggert-Waters requires FEMA to
develop for “named” storms a post-assessment protocol and
database for the purpose of creating a system for allocating
losses among wind and water perils.89 Work under this
delegated authority has barely begun, but it may be expected to
parallel developments in CAT storm insurance that have
emerged among private reinsurers and international CAT storm
efforts involving “parametric insurance,” which trigger coverage
based on such macro-features as wind-speed at particular
measuring locations rather than ex-post micro determinations
of particular losses to determine whether wind or water caused
the loss.90 In the short term, it is also noteworthy that BiggertWaters requires FEMA, at a state’s request, to participate in

87 See Brett Logiurato, The House Has Passed More than $50 Billion in
Sandy Aid, Despite Heavy Republican Opposition, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 15,
2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sandy-relief-bill-vote-porkcongress-conservatives-2013-1.

Consumer Option for an Alternative System to Allocate Losses Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100251, 126 Stat. 969 (2012).
88

89

Id. at § 100252.

For background information on parametric insurance coverage, including
its use in the much-touted Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, see
generally Lauren Brooks, The Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility:
Parametric Insurance Payouts Without Proper Parameters, 2 ARIZ. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 135 (2012).
90
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state-sponsored non-binding mediations to resolve insurance
claims disputes.91
The principal change enacted by Biggert-Waters, however, is
to mark the beginning of the end for NFIP’s historically belowmarket insurance rates for flood insurance. The Act requires
premium rate adjustments for any property located within an
NFIP-participating area to reflect the property location’s current
risk of flooding and to take effect upon the “effective date” of any
revised or updated flood insurance rate maps.92 New properties
insured under the NFIP––those not currently covered––must
be based on “actuarial rates.”93 Rates for homes currently
insured under the NFIP are allowed to rise by 20% annually,
over a five-year period, until their rates also reflect the
“actuarial” risk.94 Special subsidies that in the past were given
For background information on disaster mediation programs, see
generally Bobby Marzine Harges, Disaster Mediation Programs -- Ensuring
Fairness and Quality for Minority Participants, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 893 (2011).
91

92 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100207, 126 Stat. 919 (codified at amended 42
U.S.C. 4015 (2012)) (“[A]ny property located in an area that is participating in
the national flood insurance program shall have the risk premium rate charged
for flood insurance on such property adjusted to accurately reflect the current
risk of flood to such property, subject to any other provision of this Act.”). Since
its enactment, however, there have been numerous efforts to repeal or delay
implementation of coastal rate hikes. Senator Mary Landrieu (D-La) has
worked especially hard to stall rate increases. See Arthur D. Postal, Louisiana
Senators Push for Delay in NFIP Rate Hikes, PROPERTY CASUALTY 360 (May 8,
2013), available at
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2013/05/08/louisiana-senators-pushfor-delay-in-nfip-rate-hik. See also Evan Lehmann, Coastal Lawmakers,
Fearing Rate Hikes, Cross Party Lines to Keep Flood Insurance Subsidies, E&E
PUBLISHING, LLC (June 7, 2013), available at
http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059982464.
93

Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205, 126 Stat. 919 (2012).

94

Id. at § 100207
Any increase in the risk premium rate charged for flood
insurance on any property that is covered by a flood
insurance policy on the effective date of such an update that
is a result of such updating shall be phased in over a 5-year
period, at the rate of 20 percent for each year following such
effective date.
Id.

32

Fall 2013

Rutgers Journal of Law & Public Policy

Vol 11:1

to second homes, business properties, severe repetitive loss
properties, or substantially improved/damaged properties, are
to be phased out entirely, with rates for such properties to
increase by 25% per year until premiums meet the “full actuarial
cost.”95 Prior to FEMA’s development of these updated rate
maps, the Act establishes new, minimum property deductibles
of $1,500 for properties insured for $100,000 or less96 and
$2,000 for properties insured beyond $100,000,97 up to the
NFIP maximum of $250,000.98 Following development of the
updated FEMA rate maps, the deductibles will moderate
marginally.
As these premium increases are tied to FEMA’s notoriously
slow flood-mapping capabilities, it is significant that BiggertWaters allocates $400 million annually to FEMA’s national
flood mapping program.99 The Act requires maps for all areas
within 100-year and 500-year floodplains and “residual risk”
areas,100 and requires that the agency use the “most accurate
data” in their development.101 The Act also requires FEMA to

See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100205(a), 126 Stat. 917, (codifying the
elimination of certain special subsidies). See Pub. L. No. 112-141, §
100205(c)(3), 126 Stat. 918-919 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 4015(e)
(2012)) (providing specified increases).
95

96

See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100210(b)(1)(A), 126 Stat. 921 (2012).

97

Id. at § 100210(b)(1)(B).

98

Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100231(a)(1)(A)(i), 126 Stat. 949 (2012).

99 Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100216(f), 126 Stat. 927 (2012) (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. 4101(b)) (authority to allocate $400 million annually
between 2013 and 2017).

See id. at § 100216(b)(1)(A) (mandating ongoing program between
Administrator and Technical Mapping Advisory Council to review, update, and
maintain NFIP rate maps with respect to the 100-year floodplain, the 500-year
floodplain, areas of residual risk, areas that could be inundated in case of failed
flood control structures, and the level of protection provided by such
structures).
100

101 See id. at § 100216(b)(1)(C) (requiring the usage of “the most accurate
topography and elevation data available” for development and publishing of any
NFIP rate maps).
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contract with the National Academy of Public Administration to
conduct a study of inter-agency coordination between FEMA
and both federal and state agencies over the flood-mapping
program,102 and requires the Office of Management and Budget
to submit a report to Congress when proposing FEMA’s annual
budget, specifically highlighting crosscutting budget issues
involving mapping.103
As so many of the NFIP’s weaknesses in past years involved
hopelessly out-of-date flood maps, inadequate budget for their
revision, and pressure from local stakeholders on accurate map
updating, it is significant that Biggert-Waters provides that
appeals of FEMA mapping determinations can be based solely
on their technical and scientific validity, and creates a Scientific
Resolution Panel to address any mapping-related concerns
raised by communities who are dissatisfied with the outcome of
any appeals to FEMA.104 Although it remains to be seen where
opportunities lay, even within this revised bureaucratic
architecture, for political pressure and procedural delay, it is
significant that Biggert-Waters preemptively addressed the
issue.
Although I will briefly address other, more long-term
features of Biggert-Waters below, it is useful to recognize how
updated FEMA maps, and the new NFIP premium structure, are
already being felt on the ground. Even prior to the Act, FEMA
had updated maps prepared for areas on the New Jersey coast
devastated by Superstorm Sandy.105 In mid-December 2012,
See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100221(a), 126 Stat. 933 (2012) (requiring a
contract to form a study on how FEMA should improve coordination on
mapping and establish joint funding across agencies and governmental units to
promote sharing of data).
102

See Pub. L. No. 112-141, § 100220(a)(2), 126 Stat. 933 (2012) (codified in
amended 42 U.S.C. 4101(c)) (to display relevant sections of budget proposed for
each federal agency working on risk determination data and digital elevation
maps, and to describe the effects of integration).
103

104 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100218(a), 126 Stat. 930 (2012) (establishment of Scientific Resolution
Panel).
105 See Stephen Stirling, Jersey Shore Revolution Begins, as FEMA
Releases New Flood Maps, THE STAR-LEDGER (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:10 AM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/12/jersey_shore_revolution_begins.
html.
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FEMA released some of the new advisory maps––the first
change to New Jersey’s federal flood maps in more than two
decades––that showed many properties that had previously
been classified in a FEMA “A” zone to be reclassified into the
higher-threat “V” zone.106 The effect on rebuilding options and
the phase-in of higher NFIP flood rates can be stark. By one
account, if a property owner under the old maps had been
classified in an “A” zone, but is several feet “below” a new
reference point known as “base flood elevation,” and simply
rebuilds––especially if the damaged house had been built on a
“slab” and is simply rebuilt on the same type of foundation, and
at the same elevation––the rebuilt property would be rated at
the higher risk and would be subject, after phase in, of up to
$31,000 in annual NFIP flood-loss premium.107 If the owner
were to rebuild to the suggested “base flood elevation,” the
maximum phased-in premium would be approximately $7,000
annually.108 And if the resident were to rebuild on elevated
structures to two feet above the base flood elevation, the annual
phased-in NFIP premium would be closer to $3,500 annually.109

B. THE FUTURE OF CAT WIND OR COMBINED CAT
WIND/FLOOD INSURANCE
It is noteworthy that as Biggert-Waters ushered in a new
world of increasingly restrictive and expensive NFIP coverage
there were also nods toward more expansive possibilities. The
Act requires the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) to
submit a report to Congress on losses that would have been

106 See Gina Columbus, N.J. Officials Assess New Flood Maps in Sandy’s
Wake, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Dec. 16, 2012, 8:28 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/16/new-nj-floodmaps/1773733.
107 Edward Van Embden, New Jersey to Adopt FEMA’s Flood Elevation
Maps, Christie Says, MIDDLETON PATCH (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:50 AM),
http://middletown-nj.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/new-jerseyto-adopt-femas-flood-elevation-maps-christie-says.
108

Id.

109

Stirling, supra note 105. See also Van Emden, supra note 107.
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incurred in the notorious 2004–2005 hurricane season had the
program insured policyholders up to a maximum of $417,000—
far in excess of the current NFIP cap of $250,000.110 The Act
also charged GAO, in the same report, to evaluate whether the
Act’s phased elimination of subsidized, below-market rates for
flood insurance can change the willingness of private insurers to
reenter the flood-insurance market, and on whether further
raising/lowering rates could provide the tipping point to induce
just such a reawakening of interest in the private market.111 The
Act separately charged GAO with reporting on whether the
NFIP, if properly priced, could offer business interruption and
additional-living-expenses coverage, features not now available
through NFIP policies.112 More broadly, the Act requires the
Director of the Federal Insurance Office to conduct a study on
the current state of the market for general “natural catastrophe
insurance in the United States” and submit the report to
Congress by July 2013.113
These measures indicate the
collection of information for even broader changes to the NFIP
by future, budget-constrained Congresses.

III. CONCLUSION
In the short term, some things will remain the same. There
will be CAT flood and wind losses, and there will continue to be
wind versus water disputes over coverage in particular areas.
But, because of the NFIP amendments, it is also likely that the
next ten years of CAT coverage will be different from the
previous ten years. NFIP premiums will rise and private
insurers may reconsider entering the flood-risk market
themselves, perhaps with cheaper options analogous to majormedical-only coverage designed to cover only worst-case losses.
In light of rising costs, insureds may increasingly opt for higher
110 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100231(a)(1)-(2), 126 Stat. 949-50 (2012).
111

See id. § 100231(a)(4).

See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100233(a)(1), 126 Stat. 955 (2012).
112

113 See Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, Pub. L. No. 112141, § 100247(a), 126 Stat. 967 (2012).
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deductibles and self-insurance to keep premiums manageable.
All of these trends will continue to fragment the financing of
CAT losses in the United States. Fragmentation aside, the slow
internalization of CAT losses by private markets and
governmental budgets may, perhaps slowly, reinforce efforts to
retrofit our floodplains and coasts with structures more resilient
to storms.
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